Information Security News
This is a guest diary submitted by Brad Duncan.
For the past year or so, Ive noticed a particular group using a gate that redirects to an exploit kit (EK), usually Fiesta. This gate has evolved over the past year, changing IP addresses, domain names, and URL patterns. Currently, this gate is using 188.8.131.52 as its IP address.
I infected a VM on 2014-12-24 using the original referer from an example I found after searching for 184.108.40.206 in my organizations web traffic logs. The image below shows the gate on 220.127.116.11 and Fiesta EK on 18.104.22.168.
Shown above: Wireshark display for the Fiesta EK infection using this gate.
Monitoring the infection traffic with Security Onion shows the appropriate Snort signatures for Fiesta EK:
Shown above: Snort events from Security Onion using the ET open signature set.
Lets examine how the gate points to Fiesta EK. Earlier this year, the gate used a fairly straightforward iframe. Heres an example from April 2014:
Shown above: Gate to Fiesta EK from April 2014.
Search your web traffic logs for 22.214.171.124, and youll likely find several different domain names using a specific pattern for the gate. Heres a sample of what I found for 126.96.36.199 from 2014-12-10 through 2014-12-23:
All the above domains are registered to same organization:
Registrant name/organization: Wuxi Yilian LLC
Registrant country: China
alpinias.com - date registered: 2014-08-29
astroysch.com - date registered: 2014-10-27
avtrokosmo.com - date registered: 2014-12-01
bendjoblac.com - date registered: 2014-11-12
enotikkiki.com - date registered: 2014-10-21
kattyjerem.com - date registered: 2014-11-12
hillarysday.com - date registered: 2014-09-18
magggnitia.com - date registered: 2014-12-01
magicalcepp.com - date registered: 2014-09-18
magnitigus.com - date registered: 2014-12-01
margartata.com - date registered: 2014-12-01
martinegris.com - date registered: 2014-10-21
muertiose.com - date registered: 2014-10-03
throneonetwo.com - date registered: 2014-10-27
treestois.com - date registered: 2014-12-01
velasvegas.com - date registered: 2014-11-12
Each of the domains on 188.8.131.52 is tied to a particular compromised website. If you have access to the web traffic and the HTTP headers, its easy to find the compromised website. Just look for the referer in the HTTP GET request on 184.108.40.206.
The group behind these domains has used at least 4 different IP addresses during the past year. It will likely change again. Wuxi Yilian LLC is the registrant for all the domains Ive found for this redirect in 2014.
I look forward to seeing what this group does in 2015.
Brad Duncan is a Security Analyst at Rackspace, and he runs a blog on malware traffic analysis at http://www.malware-traffic-analysis.net(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.