Information Security News
Cerber ransomware has been a constant presence since it was first discovered in February 2016. Since then, Ive seen it consistently pushed by exploit kits (like Rig and Magnitude) from the pseudoDarkleech and other campaigns. Ive also been tracking Cerber on a daily basis from malicious spam (malspam).
Some malspam pushing Cerber is part of the Blank Slate campaign. Why call it Blank Slate? Because the emails have no message text, and theres nothing to indicate what, exactly, the attachments are. Subject lines and attachment names are vague and usually consist of random numbers.
Blank Slate has pushed different types of ransomware. However, the vast majority of ransomware from this campaign has been Cerber. I wrote an in-depth article about Blank Slate earlier this month, and it border-width:2px" />
Shown above: Chain of events for a Blank Slate Cerber infection.
Lets look at some examples from Monday and Tuesday of this week (2017-03-20 and 2017-03-21).
Like other malspam campaigns, Blank Slate emails come from numerous hosts across the globe. I always think of this as botnet-based malspam, but I dont have any visibility on the sending side. border-width:2px" />
Shown above: Ten emails from this campaign on 2017-03-20 and 03-21.
Sending email addresses are always spoofed. The only reliable source data consists of IP addresses for sending mail servers, specifically the one that directly contacted the recipients mail server, as noted in the email headers. Everything else in an email can probably be spoofed.
What does one of these emails look like? Below is a screen shot with the recipient border-width:2px" />
Shown above: An email from the Blank Slate campaign.
Whats in the zip file attachment? width:615px" />
Shown above: Contents of the zip attachment from a Blank Slate campaign email.
Whats in that zip within the zip? Its either a Microsoft Word document, or its a .js file. In this case its a .js file. I border-width:2px" />
Shown above: Contents of the zip archive within the zip archive.
The .js file contains obfuscated script. border-width:2px" />
Shown above: Start of obfuscated script in the .js file.
On Monday 2017-03-20, I ran one of the extracted .js files on a vulnerable Windows host. After an initial HTTP GET request for the ransomware binary, post-infection traffic was similar to several other recent examples of Cerber. Youll see UDP traffic from the infected host over port 6892. Thats followed by HTTP traffic to a domain starting with p27dokhpz2n7nvgr and ending with .top. IP addresses for the UDP traffic changes every week or two (or longer). border-width:2px" />
Shown above: Infection traffic from Monday 2017-03-20.
The infected Windows host acted similar to other hosts Ive infected in previous months. Along with the desktop background, decryption instructions were dropped to the desktop in three different files. border-width:2px" />
Shown above: An infected Windows host from Monday 2017-03-20.
The decryption process hasnt changed in recent months. Recently, whenever Ive checked Cerber decryption instructions, the ransom was consistently $500 US dollars. The bitcoin amount had always reflected that $500 dollar value. But this weeks example was different. border-width:2px" />
Shown above: Cerber decryptor page with the ransom cost.
Indicators of Compromise (IoC)
The following IP is traffic generated by the extracted .js files that downloaded Cerber:
Post-infection Cerber traffic:
Cerber samples collected using this batch of emails:
I always wonder how effective campaigns like this are. Potential victims must open an attachment from a blank email, go through two zip archives, then double-click the final file. If the final file is a Word document, the victim must also enable macros.
And that works on default Windows configurations. But properly-administered Windows hosts and decent email filtering are enough, I think, to keep most people from worring about it. Im far more interested in the cycle of abuse targeting hosting providers. Without web servers to host ransomware binaries, Blank Slate cannot continue its current method of operations.
brad [at] malware-traffic-analysis.net