Information Security News
ackground: url(">VMWarehas released a security advisory background: url(">VMSA-2015-0009that address a critical background: url(">deserializationvulnerability.A background: url(">deserializationvulnerability involving Apache Commons-collections and a specially constructed chain of classes exists. Successful exploitation could result in remote code execution, with the permissions of the application using the Commons-collections library.
More details are available at the background: url(">VMWareSecurity Advisory page located at background: url(">russelleubanks (c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
On Thursday 2015-12-18 during a Rig exploit kit (EK) infection in my lab environment, I saw the same infection chain patterns from a criminal group I hadnt noticed in a long time.
This appears to be the same actor that was using Sweet Orange EK to distribute Qbot malware in 2014 and early 2015 [1, 2, 3]. Why? Because the same type of obfuscation is used to generate the gate URL that I saw last year. The payload is also the same that Ive seen from this actor (Qbot).
This actor appears to be using Rig EK now. Let" />
Shown above: Flow chart for todays infection by this actor.
The EK traffic was identified as Rig EK when I read a traffic of the traffic using Snort 126.96.36.199 with the Snort registered rule set." />
Shown above: Alerts from the traffic using the Snort subscriber ruleset.
How does this actor generate the gate URL from the compromised website? Its done through injected script that uses several obfuscation tricks. One of the HTTP GET requests to the compromised website returned a .js file withe the malicious script tacked on the end of it. If you look at the TCP stream for this HTTP GET request in Wireshark, it" />
Shown above: HTTP GET request for the .js file when viewing the TCP stream in Wireshark.
Youll neet to export HTTP objects from the pcap to look at the actual .js file." />
Shown above: Malicious script in .js file from the compromised site.
In the above image, the end of the normal .js file is highlighted in orange near the top. Everything after that is the injected malicious script. Ive highlighted code for the gate URL in yellow. How do you translate that to the actual gate URL? It uses both unicode and hexadecimal obfuscation for some of the letters in the URL. Theres also a j7aMn function thats previously defined earlier in the script, and that" />
Shown above: How to resolve some of the obfuscation for the gate URL.
The gate URL returns a variable called main_color_handle. This contains a long string of characters that the earlier malicious script uses to get the Rig EK landing page URL. First, youll have to take everything away except 0 through 9 and a through f from the variable. Then translate the result from hexadecimal to ASCII. Thats how you" />
Shown above: How to get the EK landing page URL from data returned by the gate.
Todays Rig EK example follows the same traffic patterns that Ive examined many times before." />
Shown above: VirusTotal results showing recent URLs on 188.8.131.52.
Pcap and malware samples used in this diary are available here.
Earlier today, we were notified of a vulnerability in an operating system named ScreenOS used to manage firewalls sold by Juniper Networks. Yesterday, Juniper Networks announced that ScreenOS contains unauthorized code that surreptitiously decrypts traffic sent through virtual private network (VPN) connections .
The vulnerability has been designated as CVE-2015-7755. Junipers Security Incident Response Team (SIRT) strongly recommends users upgrade to a fixed release of ScreenOS to resolve these critical vulnerabilities .
Juniper firewalls using ScreenOS 6.2.0r15 through 6.2.0r18 and 6.3.0r12 through 6.3.0r20 are affected and should be patched immediately.
See the CVE link above or references below for more information.
The Democratic National Committee has cut off the Bernie Sanders campaign's access to a voter database after allegations that Sanders staff members improperly viewed confidential information gathered by the campaign of Hillary Clinton.
The Sanders campaign fired the staff member who was responsible for accessing the data, according to multiple media reports. The breach was made possible by a bad patch applied by the software vendor that operates the database.
"The discovery sparked alarm at the DNC, which promptly shut off the Sanders campaign’s access to the strategically crucial list of likely Democratic voters," The Washington Post reported today. "The DNC maintains the master list and rents it to national and state campaigns, which then add their own, proprietary information gathered by field workers and volunteers. Firewalls are supposed to prevent campaigns from viewing data gathered by their rivals."
Posted by InfoSec News on Dec 18https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/dnc-sanders-campaign-improperly-accessed-clinton-voter-data/2015/12/17/a2e2e14e-a522-11e5-b53d-972e2751f433_story.html
Posted by InfoSec News on Dec 18http://motherboard.vice.com/read/when-the-internet-of-things-starts-to-feel-like-the-internet-of-shit
Posted by InfoSec News on Dec 18http://www.fayobserver.com/military/civilian-found-living-in-special-forces-barracks-on-fort-bragg/article_dfe374fe-846e-5dfd-9459-bb73a6d27fbe.html
Posted by InfoSec News on Dec 18http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/12/unauthorized-code-in-juniper-firewalls-decrypts-encrypted-vpn-traffic/
Posted by InfoSec News on Dec 18Forwarded fFrom: Alexander Lashkov <ALashkov (at) ptsecurity.com>